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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
This thesis attempts a multi-dimensional epistemology for our fast-changing scientific age, which
is in an apparent need for an 'empirically adequate'

understanding of complexed events. Causal sequence,
linearity, and the classical Cartesian separation
between mind and matter have already become obsolete;
and replaced by (1) Acausation -- or events in the
world not usually causally related; (2) Nonlinearity
-- or events that are multi-dimensional and/or non-

sequential or disconnected; and (3) Consciousness -or events having some apparent 'knowledge'" contained

within itself -- which can be considered rational,
irrational or both. Physical and social scientists,
whose innovations will be documented, have been

utilizing acausation, nonlinearity and consciousness
for several decades.

Several contemporary philosophers are selected
to demonstrate that

there

a

critical need for a

new epistemology -- to 'bridge the gap' between the

notion of truth and the theory of meaning. By combining the innovations of our physical and social

scientists along with the theories of our contemporary philosophers, I hope to at least show a credible

possibility for 'bridging the wider gap'between the
physical and the social sciences.

FORWARD

"A Radical Epistemology of

1

'Other Worlds'" involves

.

.

'

2

thsmes

j

(1) Acausation,

(2) Nonlinearity

and (3) Consciousness. The atributes of each will
be demonstrated within four sections.
SECTION I. The 'Other Worlds' Of The
Physical Sciences.
SECTION II. The Merger of Mechanical &

Consciousness Systems Into The Acausal
Behavior Of 'Other Worlds.'
SECTION III.

The Social Sciences And Its
'Other Worlds
.

SECTION IV.

The 'Other Worlds' Of Contemporary

Philosophy

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

All the following terms,

though general in

scope, will be further clarified in detail, and
in all their relationships and variations where

used in each section.

Acausation -- involves events occuring without cause.
Causa Sui -- are causes of itself which do not owe
its being to something else.

Complex Events -- are more than one event that
usually demonstrate a relationship toward each
other

Collective Need -- relates to mental or physical
events that depend upon each other for completion.
Consciousness
involves events having some apparent
knowledge' contained within itself
which can be
considered rational, irrational or both.
Discontinuity -- involves events that demonstrate

—

isolation and not connected to other events.
Exponen tiali ty -- involves the doubling of units by

splitting in halves.
Historicism - - involves the deterministic role that
environment past and present plays upon mental
and physical events.

Indeterminancy -- is the lack of certainty for arriving
at conclusions which usually require some correlation
translation and conditional points of view rather
than absolute truths.

Infinity -- whether physical or mental, demonstrates

unlimited capacities within unlimited dimensions.
Noncontinual -- are isolated qualifications.
Nonlinearit y -- involves events that are multidimensional and/or nonsequential or disconnected.

Nonsequential -- are disconnected events that are
unrelated, non-enumerative and not continuous.
,

Ordered Connectedness -- involve sets that have a
consecutive relation within a determined system.
Other Worlds -- generic term for events or things
of other dimensions, other times, other
places, other values or other systems.
Points Of View -- assume uncertainty and attempts
emp irical adequacy with satisfactory probabilities

Reverse Historiclsin -- is the ability of a
single unit to
affect time, determinancy and events.

Simultaneity -- is the ability of events to occur at
an apparent same time. Since certainty is usually
not acceptable (within this paper's scope),
'same time' has a relevance 'to all practical
purposes' only.

Consequently, whenever the three major themes are
used: (1) Acausation (2) Nonlinearity and (3) Consciousness, most of the defined attributes will
qualify each theme.

Generally, the qualifying attributes will be
found under these three major themes:

ACAUSATION

NONLINEARITY

/
•

Causa Sui

•

Complex Events

•

Ordered Connectedne

•

Simultaneity

•

Noncontinual

•

Collective Need

•

Nonlocality

•

Other Worlds

•

Discontinuity

•

Indeterminate

•

Historicism

•

Non-Sequential

•

Reverse Historicism

•

Infinity

•

Points of View

•

Exponentiality

CHAPTER

II

THE 'OTHER WORLDS' OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION #1

Simultaneity

:

As recently as April 1984, an article appeared

about robotics, describing the last but greatest
difficulty for a computer to perform like the human
brain: to solve problems

s

imultaneous ly rather than

consecutively. David McDonald, a professor of computer
information science, stated that:
<The computer scientists '> goal is to create a
machine that can obey written or spoken commands
in several languages, reason logically, write
computer programs without human supervision and,
most importantly, solve hundreds of interconnected problems sumultaneously rather than
consecutiydy 1
.

Called 'parallel processing,' the new technique will
enable machines to perform many computations at once,

much as the human brain does.

—

SEQUENTIALLY ARRANGED BUT NONLINEAR IN ACTION
'ONION SKIN' PARALLEL PROCESSING
Brain patterns overlap like an onion skin, with
each neural pattern arranged for parallel processing. Although information in each neural
pattern, like a computer bank, is stored sequentially, a few (or many) neural patterns in
parallel will 'fire simultaneously to obtain an
^idea' or command for action
.

ACAUSAL: when
simul taneoi

5

6

Up until now,

epistemologies of both the physical
and social sciences have traditionally espoused
a
linear methodology, based upon a consecutive series
of events. Computer Science has already presented
us with

radical epistemology for empirically demonstrating
that mental activities consist of:
1. Complexed events
5. Infinite capability
2. Nonlinear methodology
6. Consciousness

a

Acausal activity
4. Other worlds
3.

(a) Ordered connectedness
(b) Collective need

SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION #2: Contains evidence of
(1) Physical 'other worlds' in the same universe
(2) Opposite points of view can be equally
correct

Cambridge Astronomer Stephen W. Hawking has revealed
that in the regime (or 'world') of relativity, black

holes expand. In the regime of quantum theory, black holes
shrink. Both theories are correct

,

depending on which

point of view taken.

According to Hawking, the black hole attracts matter
within a galaxy and grows in mass and size. In the heart
of a black hole lies something known as a "singular ity"-a point at a

theoretical edge of space and time that

may be infinitely small. Toward that edge, all the
matter of a star or even a universe races at unimaginable

7

speed -- to be crushed into

a

region of infinite

density from which nothing escapes and where none of
the known laws of causality apply. In that vicinity
of a black hole,

there is no way to predict either

the position or the speed of matter emitted by a black

hole. Toward the 'singularity,' one can only predict
the probabilities

that certain matter will emerge in

another time or place in this universe. If matter is
spilled out to the other side, or the whi te hole, the

matter will enter another universe.

Stephen Hawking developed (above) the two
important, though apparently contradictory ways of
looking at black holes.
As illustrated, in the regime (or 'other world')
hole of
of Quantum theory, matter entering the black
in another
the Old Universe will shrink -- to re-emerge
In the regime of relativity or gravity
time or place.
hole.
theory, when matter is perceived in the black

8

matter appears to expand toward a New Universe -termed a 'white hole'.

According to Hawking, contradictory results only
reflect two different points of view -- which depend
on particula r value systems of the observer -- yet, both
views are correct.

2

Hawking's important physical discovery adds
similar scientific evidence that reinforces Niels
Bohr's Unitive Principle of Complementarity

;

that

contradictory or mutually exclusive domains or points
of view can provide an empirically adequate account.
Specifically, Bohr found that electrons sometimes
behaved as though they were particles and other times

behaved as though they were waves. The two possibilities,
wave or particle, appeared mutually exclusive; yet both
were needed to provide

comprehensive account at the

a

subatomic level.
In analogy, on a macrocosmic level,

Hawking's

Black Hole/White Hole's mutually exclusive domains

domonstrate

a

similar epistemological approach: that

complexed events from different points of view can
be found correlational and complementary -- hence
both domains,

'worlds' or points of view can be correct.

SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION #3

:

Biological Doublin g

THE EXPONENTIAL VON NEUMANN MACHINE
-- First it doubles sequentially, but then
like the parallel processing in the brain,
it occurs simultaneously.

The most advanced theory of exponential growth, and
by far the most bizarre, is biological doubling by the Von

,

9

Neumann Machine. The biological doubling of the amoeba
doubles itself by splitting naturally. The Von Neumann

Maching hopes to accomplish the same biological

doubling artificially by an actual machine reproducing itself (doubling) from the raw materials

around it.
Arthur C. Clark, considered the 'Dean' of science
fiction writers, 'brought to light' the actual attempt
of achieving this effect by the U.S. Space Agency. In his
latest novel, 2010

,

the monolith (used in his previous

novel 2001 ) goes through exponential growth. The monolith is found alongside the planet, Jupiter. Within a

very short time, by absorbing the materials of Jupiter,
the monolith doubled itself to cover the size of Jupiter

and simultaneousl y vanished -- along with Jupiter.
In Clark's final statement,

in his novel 2010

he remarks that:
the Space Agency's been toying with the idea for

years -- exponentiating machines ... a bacteriophage.
The monolith reproduces every 2 hours, but after
3
eighty hours, a million-million.

Shades of bacteria warfare to an almost simultaneous
event -- (simultaneous for all practical purposes).

EXPONENTIAL ^
BACTERIOPHAGE

10

A NEW NOTION OF CAUSALITY

The fundamental role of nonlocal connections and
of probability in atomic physics requires a new notion
of causality.

Classical science was constructed by the
Cartesian method of analyzing the world into parts and

arranging those parts according to causal laws. The
resulting deterministic picture of the universe was
closely related to the image of nature as a clockwork.
In atomic physics, such a mechanical and deterministic
picture is no longer possible. ^
In Quantum Theory,

individual events do not always

have a well-defined cause. For example, the jump of an

electron from one atomic orbit to another, or the dis-

integration of a subatomic particle, may occur spontaneous ly without any single event causing it. We can
only predict its probability. This does not mean that

atomic events occur in completely arbitrary fashion; it
means only that they are not brought about by local causes
The behavior of any part is definitely affected by its

nonlocal connections to the whole.

^

The concepts of nonlocality and statistical causality imply quite clearly that the structure of matter
and the structure of mind show that human consciousness
plays a crucial role in the process of observation. From

demonstrations, the observer is not only necessary to
observe the properties of an atomic phenomenon, but he
or she is necessary to bring about these properties. My
conscious decision how to observe an electron will
determine the electron's properties to some extent, as

exemplified by Bell's Theorem on page 24, and the
Quantum Theory Copenhagen Interpretation on page 36.

.

11

POINT OF VIEW AND CONSCIOUSNESS
When Niels Bohr investigated electrons, if he
looked for particles, the electrons behaved like

particles. When he looked for waves, the electrons
behaved like waves. What Bohr discovered was that electrons
have objective properties that are not necessarily

independent of the observer's mind. Consequently, in
atomic physics, the sharp Cartesian division between
mind and matter, between the observer and the observed,
can no longer be maintained. We, therefore, can never
speak about nature without simultaneously speaking
about ourselves. Thus, the scientific results obtained
will be conditioned by our point of vie w.

SYNCHRONICITY: ACAUSAL ORDEREDNESS
-- A

distinction between causal (local) and acausal
(nonlocal)
Carl Jung postulated that psychological patterns

were connected not only causally but also acausally. In
particular, he introduced the terms "synchronicity" for

acausal connections between symbolic images in the inner
psychic 'world' and events in the external 'world.' Jung
saw these synchronistic connections as specific examples
of a more general "acausal orderedness" in mind and

matter. Today, this view seems supported by several
developments in physics. The notion of order, or more

.

.

12

precisely, of ordered connectedness are now also making
a distinction between causal (or local) and
acausal
(or nonlocal) connections.
Consequently, observations of physical matter and
,

observations of mind demonstrate a correlation, as
exemplified by Niels Bohr's observations of the
electron
Following, in the explanations of brain/mind systems
and the merger of mechanical & consciousness systems
into acausal behavior, a notion of order, specifically
of ordered connectedness will be demonstrated more

fully

NONLINEAR 'WORLDS' OF CAUSALITY

Within the brain/mind sys tern sequential events at
one level cause sequential events at other levels to
fire simultaneously, which result in acausal events.
,

To deal with the complexities of the brain/mind

system, we have to be able to slip between levels of

nonlinearity. Moreover, we will have to admit various
types of

'causality': ways in which an event at one

linear level of description can 'cause' events at other
levels to happen.

13

ACAUSAL: when 'fires'
simultaneously

Sometimes a sequential event A 1 will be said to
'cause' event B simply for the reason that the one is
a

translation of another level

.

Sometimes three or

more will 'fire' simultaneously -- which is nonsequential
for all practical purposes.

8

Both types: sequential causality and acausality -and perhaps some more -- will have to be admitted in
any explanation of mind,

for we will have to admit

'causes'

that propagate both upwards and downwards (nonlinear)
in the

'Tangled Hierarchy Of Mentality.'

g

VARIOUS CAUSAL AND ACAUSAL POTENCIES

Like Hofstadter, the neuroscientist, Roger
Sperry, in his article, "Mind, Brain and Humanist Values
states that there exists within the brain many worlds of

diverse causal and acausal forces. Within each world are
forces within forces "as in no other cubic half-foot of
univers6that we know." In the nonlinear brain model proposed here, the causal potency of an idea or an ideal
becomes just as real as that of a cell or a nerve impulse.
Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They interact with each other and with other mental forces in
the same brain,

in neighboring brains, and thanks to

14

global communication, in far distant foreign brains.
Hence, they also can interact with external consciousness acausally, to affect 'other worlds' as well.

PROBABILITY AND 'CONSCIOUSNESS'

In more formal

terms, a complex system can only

be described by using a probability distribution that

relates the possible outcomes of an experiment. In
order to decide among the various alternatives, a

measurement is required. This measurement describes
the event, as distinguished from the probability, which
mathematical abstraction. However, the only simple
and consistent description physicists were able to assign
to a measurement involved an observer's becoming aware
of the result. Thus the physical event and the content
is a

of the human mind were inseparable

.

This nonsequential

linkage forced many researchers to seriously consider
consciousness as an integral part of the structure of
This led to the nonlinear content of consciousness as an ultimate reality. We have thus, in linear steps,
gone around an epistemological circle -- from the mind

physics.

back to the mind.

11

DISCONTINUITY AND 'CAUSA SUI'
IN EVOLUTION

In the next few pages,

Stephen Gould's article about

'

15

’Punctuated Equilibrium' demonstrates dramatic instances
discontinuity in evolution, and a causa sui origin
of the universe itself. The "big bang," is a cosmic
example of a discontinuity. The beginning of life,

while less cataclysmic, is certainly another example.
The origin of life does not deny the underlying laws
of physics, but it adds a new feature: large scale
nonlinear molecular events. This rule change makes

evolutionary history indeterminate and thereby constitutes a clear-cut discontinuity of 'other worlds.'

CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER II:
THE 'OTHER WORLDS' OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

The fundamental role of nonlocal connections, or
of relations and extensions to

'other worlds,' and of

the probabilities in the physical and social sciences,

now require a new notion of causality. The concepts of

non-locality (nonlinearity) and acausation imply quite
clearly that the structure of matter is not mechanical
--

in the Cartesian sense. The apparent similarities

between the structure of matter and the structure of
mind show that human consciousness plays a crucial
role in the process of observation -- even in the

physical 'world

.

Hopefully, Section

I

demonstrated at least

these

three innovations:

Innovation of Simultaneity The human brain
solves problems simultaneously even though each pattern
1

,

.

arranged sequentially. A physical potential for
simultaneity exists by biological doubling, and
is

within the 'other worlds' of acausal orderedness.
Innovation of Finding Physical 'Other Worlds. "
Hawking's Black Hole/White Hole discovery of
2

.

'other worlds'

in the same universe adds physical

evidence of nonlinearity.
Opposite Points Of View can be equally correct,
as demonstrated by Stephen Hawking and Niels Bohr.
3.

CHAPTER

III

THE MERGER OF MECHANICAL & CONSCIOUSNESS
SYSTEMS INTO ACAUSAL BEHAVIOR
Paul E. Rapp of the Medical College of Pennsylvania
observes that computer-based electronic control systems
are becoming "more biological." Rapp’s concern is that
complex electronic networks "may display a failure mode

analagous to a convulsion." Already there is evidence
that computer systems have acted with an apparent consciousness and have suffered mysterious breakdowns during
military exercises and even in aircraft control systems. 12
This combining of computer networks and physiological
systems is an emerging field

of'

mathematics called 'topo-

logical dynamics,' which describes the way in which systems

change with time. This mathematical approach suggests that
systems governed by physical laws can undergo transitions
to a highly irregular form of consciousness.

David Ruelle of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques in France suggest that systems showing "chaotic"

behavior are frequently encountered in physics, chemistry
and biology.

17

,

One example, shown on the previous page, is the
illustrated, three-dimensional "Phase portrait" of a

chaotic state for an oscillating chemical reaction, in
which the concentrations of components can fluctuate

wildly over time. Analysis of the geometrical form
reveals whether the system is still governed by deter-

ministic equations like in (A), or behaving randomly
(noisy) like in (B)

The graph's trajectories demon-

.

strate an indeterminate, conscious behavior termed

"chaotic" in a mathematical sense.

13

Often, the relationship expressed in the equations
is nonlinear;

that is,

input and output are not pro-

portional. Mathematicians have learned that under the
right conditions, even simple sets of nonlinear differential equations can yield numbers that appear as
a

non-sequential pattern.

EVOLUTION'S 'PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM*
contain the attributes: Points of View,
Causa Sui, Indeterminancy, Noncontinual

Simultaniety

,

and Nonsequential.

To Stephen Jay Gould,

the

'origin of species

in

their lif e-and-death struggle takes on less significance,
because it produces very little evolutionary change.
Instead, by mechanisms not yet understood, new species
This
appear to split off at random from existing ones.
'splitting off was not by gradual growth from one
generation to the next but discontinuously called

19

"punctuated equilibrium." Evolutionary biology is a
synthesis of paleontology, population genetics and

comparative anatomy, each with its own point of view.
"Punctuated Equilibrium" suggests that the equlibrium of life is 'punctuated' from time to time by
severe stress. If a small segment of the ancestral

population is isolated at the periphery of its accustomed
range, it may give way to a new species. Also, the population is stressed intensely because it is living at
the edge of its tolerance.

"Favorable variations spread

quickly," Stephen Gould said. "Small peripheral isolates
are the laboratory of evolutionary change."
The old paradigm saw evolution as a steady climb
up a ladder, whereas Gould and others liken it to a

branching out of various limbs of a tree. For instance,
anthropologists have discovered in recent years that at
one time (non-sequentially ) there were at least three
coexisting hominids -- creatures that had evolved beyond
the ape. Earlier it was believed that these different
specimens formed a sequence. Several different lineages
split from the parent stock, the lower primates. Some

.

20

survived and continued to evolve, while others disappeared. The large-brained Homo appeared quite suddenly.

PLURALISTIC POINTS OF VIEW
(1) Communal Consciousness
(2) Collective Need

We need pluralistic philosophers that free us to see

evidence from many points of view. Colin Wilson suggested
that there is not only Communal Consciousness among a
genus but that its very existence is due to a telepathic

genetic connection. The genus-community is, in a sense,
a

single individual or a single mind whose genes were

influenced by the collective mind.

CONSCIOUSNESS; MIND THINKING ITSELF
(CAUSA SUI)

a

Aristotle was the first to analyze consciousness as
form of acausation -- in that of 'mind thinking itself,'

where subject and object are non-sequential but identical.
Even though categorized into form and matter or into
potentiality and actuality, they are inseparable, and
for all practical purposes operate simultaneously and

acausally
To Aristotle, this 'divine-like' attribute of mind
was termed Nous which denoted the faculty of apprehending
the first principle of science, the forms and eternal
,

.

,

21

intelligible substances, and is thus distinguished
from discursive thought. Aristotle distinguished between the nous pathetikos or passive reason, and a
.

higher active reason, called by the commentators nous
poiet ikos which alone is 'truly divine and eternal,'
and which is related to the nous pathetikos as form to
IQ
matter
This relationship between potentiality and actuality,
in relation to form and matter, Aristotle applied to
his theory of mind thinking itself. Here, like form to

matter, the subject of thought is likewise not separated
from its object.
De Anima 430^3-5;
Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as
its objects are.
For (a) in the case of objects
which involve no matter, what thinks and what is
thought are identical; for speculative knowledge
and its object are identical.
De Anima 300^15-25
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in
the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior
to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole
it is not prior even in time.
;

'

MIND THINKING ITSELF' IS ANALAGOUS

TO THE 'CONSCIOUSNESS' OF BELL'S THEOREM

Bell's Theorem

physicist John

S.

,

f

irs t proposed in 1964 by the

Bell, was first confirmed by experi-

ment in 1972 by Professor John Clauser at Berkley:
If the statistical predictions of quantum theory
are true, an objective universe is incompatible
with the law of local causes. 19
The above statement simply states that an 'objective

.

22

universe does not exist apart from our
consciousness
and that instantaneous change in widely
separated
systems did occur. In 1972, Clauser confirmed the

statistical predictions working with an elaborate
system involving photons, calcite crystals, and photo
r
90
multiplier tubes.
^

In consequence,

two particles, once in contact,

separated even to the ends of the universe, changed
instantaneously when a change in one of them occurs. In
some unexplainable way, the separated particles are still
in contact although separated in space. The only possible

explanation is that particles also have some form of
'consciousness' or information.

When we fire a photon through a single open slit,
as in (B),

the photon is registered straight on the

photographic plate. But, when we fire

a

photon as in (C)

in the same straight manner against a double opening, the

particle will change its course, find the opening and
register straight through the opening as seen on (C)-or, the photon will sometimes split into two particles,
sometimes register as two particles, or sometimes register

23

as one photon as seen on (A).

The question raised was, "How did the photon 'know'
change its natural course?" Some physicists, like E.H.

to

Walker, speculate that photons, which are energy, do
appear to process information and act accordingly.

MATHEMATICAL NONLINEARTY

Douglas Hofstadter's 1980 Pulitzer Prize-winning
book, Gddel, Escher, Bach radicalized logic. From
,

certainty, consistency and linear levels of computation,
logic is now, and should be observed from, a hermeneutical

point of view which encompasses undefined multilevels in,

cons is tencies and many infinities.

Hofstadter begins with Kurt Gddel'
Theorem:

s

Incompleteness

"All consistent axiomatic formulations of number

theory include undecidable propositions."

22

Then, Hofstadter stressed a need for interpretations
to regain any logical consistency,

by clarifying the

necessity of different points of view for computation.
By changing interpretations we regained a consistency
It now becomes clear that consistency is not a property of a formal system per se, but depends on the
interpretation proposed for it. By the same token,
inconsistency is not an intrinsic property of any
23
formal system.
The certainty of predictability is replaced from tradition
al particularities to relations of multi-levels, or nonlinearity, which Hofstadter terms recursion -- which is a

domain where

'

sameness-in-dif f erentness

plays a central

role. Recursion is based on the same thing happening on
several different levels at once. But the events on

24

different levels are not exactly the same.
Hofstadter correlates language-usage with computer
systems, and demonstrates why traditional language usage
archaic for comprehending recursion. What is confusing
(to Hofstadter) is when a single system admits of two or
more descriptions on different levels which resemble each
other in some way.
is

Apparently, our confusion about who we are is certainly
related to the fact that we consist of a large set of levels
-- yet a computer program can be viewed on a number of

levels, which makes all the descriptions similar in
some ways to each other -- yet there are extremely important differences on different levels. 25

Hofstadter also blames our traditional logic for its
'either-or' linear approach based on singular entities,
where entities are categorized and separated into holistic
or reductionist opposites. The author-mathematician

interestingly answers the problem by

a

combination quantum

and Zen Buddhist analogy -- by ’’unasking the question” --

similar to Hans Gadamer’s ’unasking deception.”
To ’’unask” singular entities,

certainties toward

a

is

to reject singular

notion of complementarity.

Analogically, the Zen answer rejects the premisses
of the question which are that one or the other must be
chosen. By unasking the question, it reveals a wider truth
that there is a larger context into which both holistic
and reductionist explanations fit.

26

ANALOGICAL NONLINEARITY

Hofstadter correlates mathematical infinities with

:

25

the physical nonlinearity of brain functions. He
first
compares the nonlinear functions of the brain to the
linear functions of the computer.

SYMBOLS —SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE?

With the enormous ever-growing repertoire of
symbols that exist in each brain, you might wonder
whether there eventually comes a point when the brain
is saturated ... in fact, overlapping and completely
tangled symbols are probably the rule, so that each
neuron is probably a functioning part of hundreds
of symbols. 27

CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER III;
THE MERGER OF MECHANICAL AND CONSCIOUSNESS
SYSTEMS INTO ACAUSAL BEHAVIOR

This section included the attributes of Consciousness,

Nonlinearty, Nonsequentiality, Collective Need and Indeterminancy. In summation, the chapter states the following

highlights

Computer-based electronic control systems are becoming more biological and evidence an apparent con1.

sciousness.
This merger of computer networks and physiological
systems are analyzed by a mathematics called 'topo2.

logical dynamics.'

Mechainical systems showing "chaotic" behavior are
encountered in physics, chemistry and biology.
3.

..
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Evolutionay biology, by mechanisms not yet
understood, are 'splitting off -- away from
4.

gradual growth toward

a

'punctuated equilibrium'

-- from severe stress.
5.

There is found among genera

a

communal conscious-

ness or collective mind.
6.

The mind is capable of thinking itself (causa

sui

)

7.

An objective universe does not exist apart from

our consciousness -- allowing for instantaneous change
in widely separated systems.
8.

Particles show some form of consciousness.

9.

Computations now also require different points of

view

CHAPTER

IV

In the diagram (Fig. A), neurons are laid out as

dots (solid or outline), in one plane, or level. Two
overlapping neural pathways are shown. It may happen
that two independent neural flashes simultaneously race
down these two pathways, passing through one another like
two ripples on a pond's surface. The overlapping and re-

sulting new symbols are shown as shaded dots.
Potentially, there are not only an infinite number
of pathways in a brain, but also an infinite number of
symbols. New concepts can be formed from old ones. Demon-

strated in Fig. A is a single level of brain function in
the conscious part of the brain -- traditionally con-

sidered linear, finite entities of brain patterns. These
linear brain patterns, considered formed from childhood
and continually stored in memory banks, have usually been

considered limited according to aptitude. Hofstadter shows,
that analogical credibility, even in the smallest level
of consciousness, can be realized by the overlapping of

logical patterns to form incredible unlimited new symbols.

NONLINEAR BRAIN FUNCTIONS

Computer art has demonstrated infinite variations from

27

a
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single, linear drawing. Human variations in games and
music are situated in the linear levels of consciousness (like onion skins). What if nonlinear combinations
are utilized between the levels of consciousness and

multilevels of the unconscious?

Another nonlinear dimension of infinite variations
are surfaced and demonstrated by the illustration shown

(Fig.B), where nonlinear, infinite overlapping is obtained
on many Jungian levels as well.

PSYCHOANALYTICAL NONLINEARITY

(1) The psychoanalytical views of Carl Jung demon-

strate a closer affinity to Hans Gadamer's ideas rather
than to Freud's; specifically, Jung agrees about the
nonlinearity of the unconscious which correlates to

Gadamer's his toricism and infinite consciousness.
Random
(2) Reverse historicism is evidenced by
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Experimentation where the observer reverses the causality
of the observed.
Carl C. Jung separates the unconscious levels from the

conscious by showing the unconscious levels as nonlinear
and infinite in scope, whereas the conscious levels are

linear and limited.
The area of the unconscious is enormous and always
continuous <infinite>, while the area of conscious28
ness is a restricted field of momentary vision.
ECTOPSYCHIC
SPHERE

ENDOPSYCHIC
SPHERE

PERSONAL
UNCONSCIOUS

COLLECTIVE

UNCONSCIOUS

CARL JUNG'S UNCONSCIOUS PROCESS
Jung's major contribution is considered

within his
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analysis of the two classes of the unconscious process:
-- the subconscious or Personal Unconscious, and the

Collective Unconscious.
The Subconscious or Personal Unconscious contains
recognizable material of personal origin, instinct and

personality. Included are the forgotten or repressed contents as well as creative contents.
The Collective Unconscious is of unknown origin and

mythological in character as if it belongs not to any
particular mind or person, but rather to humanity in
general. The collective patterns are termed archetypes

which mean

a

typos <imprint>, a grouping of archaic

mythological motifs, e.g. the figures of the messianic
hero,

the redeemer,

the dragon (who the hero has to over-

come) and the whale or monster who swallows the hero.

Jung hints of nonlinearity, indeterminancy and infinity

when he mentions that:
our personal unconscious, as well as the collective
unconscious, consists of an indefinite number of
complexes or fragmentary personalities. 29

JUNG'S PARALLEL TO HERMENEUTICAL HISTORICISM
-- Events of Causi Sui and Simultaneity

The Archetypal contents, in the form of images, can
be understood by comparing them to historical parallels.
integrated
If not recognized as historical, they are not
into consciousness and they remain projected. The arche
or are
types are not subject to any arbitrary intention
controllable by the will (indeterminate). They actually
yourself.
behave 'non-local' as if they did not exist in

Perhaps one of the first accounts of German
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hermeneutical historicism is recorded by Jung in 1930
during one of his many visits to colleagues in Germany.
Would you believe that a whole nation of highly intelligent and cultivated people could be seized by
the fascinating power of an archetype?
one cannot
resist it ... it is a power that fascinates people
from within
because it is an archetype ... an
incomprehensible fate has seized them ... it has
nothing to do with rational judgment, it is just
history ... whether you assume that the Nazi storm in
Germany has a religious value or not does not matter.
It has. Fascism is the Latin form of religion, and
its religious character explains why the whole thing
has such a tremendous fascination..
31
.

.

.

.

.

.

A contemporary example of American historicism at work

(to show that it could and did happen here) are the gang

rapes in the U.S., where hypnotic peer pressure and 'an

ancient reflex' incited a simultaneous event causa sui
The psychologist, Roger Rosenblatt, explains an

.

analogy to Jung's collective unconscious:
that moment of seemingly hypnotized attention
that most men know and dread. It is a moment in which
they are out of control as individuals -- not merely
outside the law, but out of biological order. Something
stirs, an ancient reflex, as if they are dragged back
through history to a starting point in evolution. 32
It is

THE 'OTHER WORLD' OF HISTORICITY
In fact, history does not belong to

us, but we belong to it.
-- Hans Gadamer

Cicero called historicity the vita memoriae which
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meant a totally different source of truth from
theoretical
reason.
It exists in its own right because human
passions
cannot be governed by the universal prescriptions of
reason."
Bacon added the level-concept by describing historicity
as

"another way of philosophising."
All are attributes of historicity. Theoretical reasoning, ideal and universal, is a level of nonlinear infinity.
A "different source of
truth," means only that it is
another universal. "It exists in its own right" and qualifies
it to its own nonlinear level,

or universal being.

Basically,

Historicity is the nonlinear, deterministic role that
history plays for the simple linear actions of humanity.

SENSUS COMMUNIS

Sensus Communis is one universal level within other
levels of historicity. It's the communal sense that de-

termines the quality of living. It's the concrete generality that can represent a people, a nation or the whole

human race. It's the external ethical sense through living
in the

community which is determined by its universal aims

through its linear circumstances.

ERLEBNIS

Er lebnis synthesizes the concept of life (leben), a

connection with totality, with infinity -- where every ac t
as an element of life remains connected with the infinity
of life that manifests itself in it. Everything finite is
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an expression, a representation of the infinite.
Hans Gadamer, however, clarifies the infinite level
or role that Erlebnis plays through the persona of Bergson.

Bergson's duree emphasized the relations of continuity
rather than parts of a whole; i.e. duree synthesized these
relations, like "listening to the melody where all the
notes intermingle." 3 6
,

Consequently, "history does not belong to us, but we
belong to it." Hans Gadamer explicitly writes of the overwhelming influence that history plays on every individual.
Free will and determination appear conveniently absent,
but when analyzed sequentially, the miniscule, finite individ-

ual will appear "imprisoned in the infinite layers

of

the

closed circuits of historical life." That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more that his judgments,
37

constitute the historical reality of his being.
The story of Carl Jung's 1930 visit to Germany supports
the overwhelming determination that historicity plays on an

entire nation. Evidently influenced by Marx, Gadamer resolves
this determined domination -- not by economics or politics,
however, but by understandin g -- cryptically fragmented by
Gadamer into a final fragment:
understanding ultimately finds its fulfillment only in
<another 'world' of> an infinite consciousness, which
38
is also the ground of the idea of individuality.

CONSCIOUSNESS: THE 'OTHER WORLD' OF
POTENTIAL REVERSE HISTORICISM

This is the crux of the Quantum Theory Copenhagen Interpretation: that the observer affects the observed.
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His tor icism has shown by its ontological independent
existence to possess the quality of affecting particular

observers. Traditional cognition has ill-defined this
process as an ability of an observer to extract information from its environment. But may the reverse also be
possible? May 'consciousness' have the ability to insert
information into its environment? i.e. may the particular

observer affect the observed or universal historicism?
The following experiment with random number generators
demonstrates that reverse historicism has been accomplished
under rigorous scientific control. The experiential methodology consisted of participants observing and ultimately

influencing sequences of random numbers solely by mental
means. The experiment involved three basic elements:
1.

A source of "true" random numbers,

typically based

on radioactive decay.
2.

A statistical analysis

3.

An individual who attempts to cause, by means alone,
a

technique.

change in the random source's output, to differ

from chance expectation during designated periods.
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The reason for this experimental methodology is to eliminate
any possible outside means of influence other than mental

influence. The only form of direct physical interraction is
shown when a participant presses

a

start button. All the

rest is controlled by computer. Specifically, the subject's
task is to cause mentally either an excess number of ones
or an excess number of zeroes in a random binary sequence.

(This is another related example within the binary infinities

already shown in math and physics).
Results of such experiments show that selected subjects
can statistically influence random sequence according to
predefined instructions. The odds of the observed distortions

35

from pure chance have been calculated at greater than one
in a 100 million. Under controlled conditions where subjects do not attempt to influence the random number
sequence, no deviation from chance is seen.

CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER IV;
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Demonstrated were recent evidence to show that
similar to subatomic physics and astronomy, the human
brain is also found to be nonlinear, and contains the

potentiality of an infinite number of symbols.
Within Contemporary German philosophy, Gadamer's
His tor icism also demonstrates

'another world' of non-

linear, deterministic capability that history plays on
the mind.

However, an individual by 'consciousness' can
reverse the deterministic historicism by a new experimental

process with random number generators. Such experiments
demonstrate that selected subjects can statistically
influence random sequence according to predefined
ins tructions

.

CHAPTER

V

THE 'OTHER WORLDS'
OF PHILOSOPHY

A 'sampling'

of contemporary philosophers are

selected to demonstrate the critical need for

new

a

epistemology -- to 'bridge' the admitted gap between
the notion of truth and the theory of meaning.
as representatives:

Hilary Putnam
Bas C. Van Fraasen

Michael Dummett
Bruce Aune

35

I

selected

.

:
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•

HILARY PUTNAM

•
•

Nonlinearity
Consciousness
Causa Sui

Putnam excellently describes how the brain translates its nonlinear images. Similar to the computer, he
writes that the brain has digital aspects "but it may
well process a considerable amount of non-digital information" <nonlinearity > In particular, translation
.

need not be 'mechanical' in all its aspects, that sometimes we match pictures to the situations we are in, in
order to find the 'frame'

to use

in translation,

< causa

sui consciousness>

To Putnam,

translation is

a

form of Vers tehen

,

in

that some of our ability to picture how people are likely
to respond may well be innate <like the collective un-

conscious>. Physics may also rest on Vers tehen as much
as

the social sciences. The contention is that Vers tehen

belongs to the 'context of discovery' <within

causa sui

a

context> and not to the 'context' of justification.'
Consequently, Putnam feels that Verstehen is

a

source of

prior probability which is ultimately intuitive.

40

PUTNAM'S PLURALISM

Consisting of: Nonlinearity & Probability

Putnam feels that the social sciences do not have
a standard of objectivity like the physical sciences. He
is not saying that scientific method has no place in the
social sciences, it is just that it is a

problem

'

pluralistic

.
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that all these have their place and we should use them
when and where we can. Should we regret the fact that
the social sciences cannot realistically hope to resemble

physical sciences?
But we have seen (in the previous essays) that in
the spectrums of subatomic physics and astronomy
that

there are 'similar' consciousness, acausation and points—
of-view, and perhaps by probability statistics we can
describe social complexed systems as 'empirically adequate'

--especially, as shown above, Putnam admits that Ver s tehn
is a source of prior probability. Putnam explicitly mentions
that

'other worlds' and different points of view require

alternate epistemologies -- that what our 'methods are in
any domain <world> will depend on what our beliefs <points
of view> are concerning the subject matter of that domain
<world> and on beliefs in other domains <other worlds>.
From such a point of view, the problem of explaining the

reliability of learning is not a priori <or nonlinear,
non-sequential> but to show that we can understand that
reality is a fact of nature <which is also acausal and

T
N
nonlinear>
Unfortunately, on the subject of meaning Putnam
loses his concept of 'other domains' <other worlds>,
^2

,

denying the inner world of consciousness. -- that meaning is not just a function of what goes on 'in our heads,'
but also of reference, and reference is determined by
social practices and by actual physical paradigms, and
not just by which goes on inside any individual speaker.
Putnam is most likely denying any reality to 'the brain
in the vat'. My previous essays on consciousness d^ exhibit
the existence of many inner worlds of 'consciousness' and
would therefore also accept 'the brain in the vat' as

another world

—

though limited in scope.

.

.
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In his later work (1982),

Putnam weakly implies the
existence of an inner world, (that particular 'consciousness' which has attributes of causa sui and nonlinearty)
by "attempting to break the strangle hold of the dichotomy

between objective and subjective views of truth." But he
never reaches the point of combining subject/object.
Instead, he almost denies the external objective world
by favoring the "idealogical label." He states that

dichotomy between 'objective' and 'subjective'
has been accepted as a characterization of types of views
once such

a

and styles of thought,

thinkers begin to view the terms of

the dichotomy almost as idealogical labels.
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Putnam's serious 'flaw', after regogizing the 'many
worlds,' disclaims the objective worlds in favor of the

subjective world -- yet, he previously denied that the
subjective world had many inner worlds of its own. Agreeing
with Kuhn, Feyerabend and Foucault, they agree that the
alternative to a r\aive copy conception of truth is to see
systems of thought, ideologies, scientific theories, as

subiective
Consequently, it seems that Putnam's subjective world
also remains in a linear domain. He strongly proclaims
is not all there is to the
that formal logic of a concept
notion of truth, and therefore a correspondence account is

needed to understand how language and science works. But,
by denying the inner world of consciousness (though admitting
'verstehn'), such a 'correspondence account' cannot have
sufficient probability statistics to validate any simplistic

correspondence
doe s
However, through his vacillations, Hilary Putnam
a 'condemonstrate the existence of 'inner worlds,' such as
and nonlinearity.
sciousness' which has attributes of causa sui

s
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and thereby comes close to combining the subject/object
'many worlds' after all.

•
•

BAS C. VAN FRAASEN

Other worlds
Probability

•
•

Empirically adequate
Nonlinearity

Fraasen's constructive empiricism creditably attempts
to update philosophy with scientific method:
Science aims to give us. theories which are empirically
adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief
only that it is empirically adequate.
46
And to Fraasen's further credit, he demonstrates that
even the observable can be a vague predicate, such as when
the sun rising and setting is "guided by a picture now

explicitly disavowed." Hence, he agrees with Reichenbach
principle of the common cause that there are the existence
'

,

of unobservable events <such as

way to view science
a

'other worlds>;

is by seeking for

the correct

'common causes' of
47

probabilistic or statistical sort.
His excellent discussion of causation by Norwood Russell

Hanson involves an agreement of 'other worlds', many points
of view, and nonlinear complexed events; that there are
many causes <nonliner> of x as there are explanations <points
of view> of X, Consider how the cause of death might have
been set out by a physician as 'multiple haemorrhage,' by
the barrister as 'negligence on the part of the driver,
by a carriage-builder as 'a defect in the brake block con-

struction,' by a civic planner as 'the presence of tall
48
shrubbery at that turning.
Even a 'simple-simple' linear event, where ^ is the
,

cause of

B|

.

.

Van Fraasen rightfully attaches the contextual
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factor "in which the sentence is uttered*" consequently,
and properly,

that linearity is also interrelated with

’outer worlds.'

He mentions that the nature of A and

^

will in most cases also play a role, indirectly, but it
is in the first place the orientation or the chosen point
of view of the speaker that determines what the word
49

'cause

is used to signify.

Fraasen marvelously recognizes most of the limitations
of 'linear-logic,' and refers to the* necessary 'omniscient'
ability to totally understand given facts, such as when
the description of some account as an explanation of a

given fact or event is incomplete. It can only be an explanation with respect to a certain relevance relation and
and a certain contrast-class <of another 'world'

omniscient Being would have

a

>

.

An

complete explanation, whereas

these contextual factors only bespeak our limitations.
But Fraasen, most correctly, does not believe in

certainties or 'complete explantions

,
'

and adequately is

updated to the epistemic commitment toward the weaker belief
that "it is empirically adequate."

FRAASEN 'S 'PROBABILITY'

--Empirical Adequacy

Fraasen competently examines 'many worlds' of probability solutions for empirical adequacy, based on David
Lewis' advanced view of laws of nature as factual statements
about "the real possible worlds (as opposed to the logical

conceivable but unreal worlds) of which ours, the actual
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one,

is but an equal among equals'* <other worlds>.

Up until recently, even the

advanced theoretical
physicists could only hope for approximation s Fraasen
is most up-to-date in presenting the potentiality of
quantity concepts. Fraasen correctly states that we do not
have exact knowledge. We only know the values of the initial
'

'

.

quantities approximately, but 'approximate' is misleadingly
vague, and can only be replaced by a quantitative concept. ^

Within Van Fraasen's 'Epistemic Probability,' quantitative
concepts is the relation that it bears to a body of information (that person's information) or of what would happen
Probability is not a property of an actual course of
events, but of the conditions in which these events occur
such as the experimental arrangement or chance set-up.
if

»

Karl Popper, in 1957, explicitly presented this as
a more sophisticated version of the frequency interpretation,

the difference lying in an appeal to what would

happen

if

,

the conditions were realized sufficiently often.

Consequently,

probability space is

a

repeatable experiment

or^

chance set-up.

a

model of a

This significanc e

has immeasurably advanced the social sciences. How? Fraasen

has laid to rest the pessimistic viewpoint that "now that

certainty is dead (like Nietzsche's 'God') all that we
Quantitative
could hope for are vague approximations
concepts within Fraasen's constructive empiricism fully

demonstrate pragmatic models for empirical adequacy.

MICHAEL DUMMETT

Dummett outlines most proficiently the 'many faces'
of realism, and summates with Wittgenstein (correctly), that

.

.
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all the same there does not yet exist proof* (of certainty).
Of course, as shown, if we combine the various points of view,
we'll at least get an 'empirically adequate' result, (i.e.,
certainty and Clark Gable is "Gone with the Wind.")

However, each face of Realism, like any linear event,
does contain linear substance that contains simple 'realities.'
I thoroughly believe in each reality, but prefer to keep
them in their simplistic linearity. In combination, we can
'move the many worlds.'
From Dummett,

extrapolate that Realis m is the belief
that statements of a linear class possess an objective truthvalue, independently of our means of knowing it. They are
I

true or false in virtue of a reality existing independently

believe it, and E.E. Moore's Common Sense states
it most aptly that when you see a moving car passing by, you

of us.

I

had better not step in front of it. That is external reality!

Antirealism takes the form of

a

species of reductionism

Thus phenomenalism holds that material-object statements are

reducible to ones about sense-data, and scientific positivism
holds that statements about electrons relate ultimately only
to pointer-readings;

-- statements about character are

really about behavior.
To Radin, each is like a politician serving self-

interest instead of collectivel y gathering linear points
adequate representation of complex
of view for a more
*

'

events
For the platonist,

the meaning of a mathematical

statement is to be explained in terms of its truth conditions; for each statement there is something in math-

ematical reality in virtue of which it is either true or
false. For the constructivist, the general form of an explanation of meaning must be in terms of the conditions
under which we regard ourselves as justified in asserting

t
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statement, that is, the circumstances in which
we are
in a possession of a proof.

a

Yet,

in our innovative logician's way of summing
up
their adequacies in toto, Wittgenstein states that
"all
the same there does not yet exist a proof, since
when we
discover the document it is still up to us to decide whether

or not we wish to count it as a proof.

1

Even with the usage that Wittgenstein recommended,
agree with Dummett that when pragmatically applied, the

terms lack certainty

others as

and only refer to or is extended to
'blind faith.'
,

DUMMETT 'S ARTICLE: "CAN AN EFFECT
PRECEDE ITS CAUSE?
(1955)"

To myself, one of Dummett's most creative contributions
is his article,

"Can An Effect Precede Its Cause?"

To

Dummett, the thought that an effect might precede its

cause appears at first nonsensical. He hints of potential
'other worlds' by leading with "perhaps if the world were
different ..."
Of prime concern to any simple event is that there

always exists the possibility of an intermediary agent

within the simple event. Hence, even though that
whenever A happens,

B follows

we can observe that an event is a sufficient condition for
an event of another kind to have taken place previously;

and why should we not then call the later event 'cause'
of the earlier?

One of Dummett's

s

tronges

arguments for this case is
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that (1) there can never be any certainty about the
simplest linear event, since during the interval some-

thing might always intervene to hinder the fulfillment
of the cause. The second strong point:

'necessary temporal' direction of causation,
Q
from earlier to later. 5
(2)

is a

^

To Radin, point (1) correctly states that even a
simple linear event has the potential of 'other worlds'

within the event and thereby contains no certainty. Point
(2) totally decimates his article as nonsense as long as
there exists a temporal direction; it would be 'naturally'
impossible to reverse time -- for all practical purposes.
However though Dummett apparently did not intend the following
,

illustration (about the alarm clock) to show acausation or
causa su i) to me, the possible implication exists for an
action of causa sui

.

During such a nonlinear, non-sequential

occasion, an effect can precede its cause -- as demonstrated
in previous essays.

Dummett

's

own 'certainty' refutes his

previous conclusion of uncertainty, to the effect that any
causal change involves quasi-causal explanation; and therefore uncertain to attempt to do this would plainly be non-

sensical that the past is fixed, and the future is fluid.
At least he should conclude with a

'potential'

60

for

complex events. In any case, Dummett intuitivel y feels that
there are the other worlds (which successively demonstrate
timeless acausation) -- otherwise he would not have raised
the question, even in jest.
Of The

Past','

you could just

In his next article,
f eel

,

"The Reality

though intuitively,

pain in trying to solve the time problem. He
comments that we are immersed in time, and being so immersed,
The past
we cannot frame any description of the world.

Dummett

's

exists only in the traces it has left upon the present; and
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that the past exists as past as it is present.
In his later work, Realism
Michael Dummett 'throws
in the towel' about the difficult temporal element of
,

causation. He admits of 'other worlds' but from a
Neutralist' (linear) viewpoint, can only cope with one
world at a time, such as he relates a semantic theory to
a world at a particular time. He gives up his previous
(correct) uncertainties and finds certainty within one
world, when he sides with the neutralist:
the central notion for a semantic theory is
not that
of a statement's being true absolutely, but of its
being true in a 'world.'
62

And then, erroneously, Dummett attempts to 'continually'

eliminate the other worlds -- to correspond one world as
'common'

to many worlds, when he states

that the set of

possible 'worlds' continually diminshes with the passage
of time;

that is to say,

the various

regarded as forming paths in

a

'worlds' may be

mathematical tree, in the

nodes of the tree -- the points at which the paths diverge,
corresponding to a state of a 'world' at a particular time,
63

each state being common to many 'worlds.'
Most contradictory! A mathematical tree is one
particular 'world' of abs tractio n The 'inner worlds' of
.

'other worlds.' The empirical 'outer worlds'
are still infinite 'other worlds.' Under no 'empirically
adequate' domain can we correspond to a state being common
the mind are

to

'many worlds.' That statement reverts to Newtonian and

Cartesian linearity.
However, as Van Fraasen demonstrated, by definite
nonlinear quantitative concepts, pragmatic modals for
empirical adequacy can be successfully accomplished.

,
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BRUCE AUNE

Though published in 1977, Bruce Aune's book, Reason
And Action best demonstrates causa sui and 'other worlds'
,

of the mind. Through "Prichard's Theory Of Voluntary

Activity," Aune clearly views the mental process as nonlinear complex events 'individuated' -- or separate from
cause and effect (which places 'action' as
V

event )

a

causa sui
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Terming the action as the process or activity of
willing itself, Prichard argued that the activity cannot
be considered causing that result. Willing is one thing

and the result another. Both occur when an action is per-

formed -- similar to the nonlinear action of several levels
of consciousness as demonstrated in Figure 1.

As shown,

action,

the

s

though patterns A

12

imultaneous action of

and A
2

.

involve sequential

or more patterns are

acausal for all practical purposes.
Consequently, to Prichard, an action is an activity;
there is no activity of causing or originating something.
What activity then will cause his foot to move? Pritchard
says this is a kind of activity of whose nature we are
but
dimly aware (though it is explained above as acausal)

he calls this activity "willing."

'

48

THE ACCORDIAN EFFECT
-- of a complex activity

Austin also goes along with activity as the causa sui
and not as any "smaller or a larger stretch of events."

When Brutus stabbed Caesar, the death of Caesar was the
causa sui of his activity and not part of it.

TRADITIONALLY, ACTIVITY INDIVIDUATED
(OR CAUSA SUI) WAS CONSIDERED 'AGENT CAUSATION"

To Aune, philosophers traditionally would reject

Prichard's basic premiss about causation; particularly
that statements affirming that a thing or person caused
or brought about a result are reducible to statements of
the form

'(3A)

Thus,

(a is an activity by

^ and A caused

E)

they would want to reject Prichard's view that so-

called agent causation is reducible to what we might call
'event causation." I agree with Aune that Prichard's view

preferable when he states that if we say that John
moved his hand at time _t, we may indeed add -- that caused
is

his hand to move at that time. But that is

not to say that

he was the irreducible cause of his hand's motion; if he
were then, since he existed yesterday, his hand should
65

have moved the same way yesterday too.
Nothing further is said, but to clarify the fallacy of
any 'agent causation,' the action is a nonlinear or complex
event which 'fires' causa sui

which is sequential.

,

and not 'accordian effect

)

.
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PRICHARD'S INDIVIDUATED ACTION
a causa sui simultaneous action

COMPLEX SIMULTANEOUS ACTION
A. To Prichard, A is supposedly the irreducible cause of
then whenever we have A, we should have
^ as well.
Clearly if John did move his hand at a certain time, then
there must have been something about him. (perhaps a complex
simultaneous 'action' or firing of neurons) at that time
A.

which accounts for occurence then
movement.
,

B.

MENTAL ACTIVITY (LIKE

When we think of a

B.

of his hand's

,

'

CONSIOUSNESS

'

person's action, we do not think

of a mere response to some physiological change. We do

think of a person as a conscious agent, but we regard his

voluntary movements as somehow due to his mental activity
(which is 'consciousness' or sumultaneous activity).
C.

This kind of (causa sui) mental activity Prichard calls

C.
I

WILLING

1

willing
.

1

•

I
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Chisholm called this activity of moving one's arm
as a very complexed one, involving beliefs and pro-attitudes
-- a special activity of 'endeavoring' (which explains the

nonlinear attributes of complex activity).
Unfortunately, Prichard insisted that willing is
'a mental activity of whose nature we are dimly aware.'
On one hand he says in doing an action we become clearly
aware by reflecting on it, but finally decides that the
nature of 'willing' is sui generis and so incapable of

being defined.

.
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To

define' with certainty would be an incapability,
but as explained several times, with the new probability
methods, pragmatic modals for empirical adequacy would

give satisfactory or significant results.
Davidson adds
further attributes to demonstrate the complexities of an
action, which consisted of
a pro

(a)

attitude towards actions with a certain

property
(b) a belief

that the action in question under a
certain description has that property.

QUINE'S INDETERMINANCY

I

agree with Quine, that all translation is relative,

or as he sometimes states,

'indeterminate.'

In his view,

no one system of analytical hypothesis can be 'absolutely'

correct. When we translate words of some language, we imply
the acceptance of a system of analytical hypotheses -- but

we really 'segment'

the language into words of our own

language -- strongly implying a narrow, individuated viewpoint.
Such individual viewpoints infer countless systems of
hypotheses, at least in principle. Though we have adopted
one system as a result of some accepted tradition, its
individual viewpoint can be seen as not any truer than its

alternative accepted traditions. Therefore, once we have
adopted a system of analytical hypotheses, we like to consider it objectively correct to translate Jacques 'll peut'
by our

'It is raining'

-- but the correctness of

this

translation is fundamentally relative: it is correct, not
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absolutely, but relatively to one particular or individuated
viewpoint. However, there are others (if not infinite 'other
worlds') at least in principle.
Aune differentiates Quine's relative indeterminancy
with referential indeterminancy -- which further demonstrates the futility of any absolute' correctness of any
one system of analytical hypothesis. For example, when we

regard certain 'inner states' as thoughts that such and
such, we are giving them a semantic interpretation that,
if Quine is right,

must be considered 'relative' rather
than 'absolute.' e.g., to say that willing to do A is an

act of thought having
A'

is merely

to say

the form 'I will (here and now) do

that it is a mental semantic counterpart

to some expression of

intention (some verbal expression)

having that form. If Quine is right, a verbal expression,
or statement, can be said to have a certain logical
form
only in a relative sense.
In a referential sense,

any reasonable conception of

volition that a person will to do something A here and
now must have some idea of what he aims to do -- the idea,

specifically, of doing A here and now. This idea has for
him the same reference as the words 'my doing A here and
now.' e.g., when a chess player is said to think 'if he

attacks with his queen,

I

will castle,' we find that his

thought has a conditional intention.
One does not even have to be able to visualize the
opponent's queen or have the word 'queen' in one's active

vocabulary. All that is necessary if one has the thought
in question, is that something going on in one's head
should be describable as having a certain semantic
-- a certain reference
character
Quine further expresses how translation is 'indeterminate
.

.
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by reference to his

'the transivity of conditioning.'

When someone has the premiss 'I will do A in circumstances C' and 'I am now in C' firmly in mind will tend
to conclude
So I will do A now' -- and this conclusion
will naturally result in appropriate behavior. But there
sre condition s involved. As often happens, a person
trained to reason will tend to skip elements in the
thought process. This explains why so much of our reasoning in everyday life is enthymematic

,

or understood but

not stated. Our movements, because of conditions involved,
may become altered between the available premisses to
the conclusion; which is another example of

how trans-

lation is indeterminate through Quine's 'the transivity
of conditioning'

-- or as Aune states,

"how individual

thoughts and statements become elliptical
Of most significance about
is

.

'Quine's indeterminancy,'

Aune's reference to its necessity for learning more

than is known at present about the way our brains work

and how linguistic behavior is related to neural

_
functioning
.

.
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THE IMPLIED NONLINEAR 'CONSCIOUSNESS'

person's operative reasons for doing something A were derived or formed. Aune says 'operative
reasons' here of a person may have premisses (beliefs
To Aune,

a

that would have been a good basis for
his intention to act but that they may not h ave entered
the reasoning process of that intention. Consequently, a
or intentions)

rationalization is not

a

genuine explanation of behavior.
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It provides a rationale for the behavior but not

the

correct rationale. Too many conditional factors keep
^
7 3
reason from being simple or linear.

HENCE, ALMOST EVERY BEHAVIOR IS SUI GENERIS

WITHOUT CAUSAL EXPLANATION

agree that 'purposive behavior' is apt to be
novel; a given instance of it may never have been obI

served before and may never be observed again.

'Purposive

behavior' cannot have causal explanations (as pre-

viously demonstrated, it is nonlinear and causa sui
Even a 'simple action' is actually Sui Generis

.)
,

and thereby considered acausal,' e.g. the breaking of

windows by a thrown rock is

a

familiar occasion, and

we have sufficient reasons of how such effects happen,

but its related laws or hidden conscious and unconscious motivations (other worlds) are not understood --

hence almost every supposed 'cause' is so novel as to
contain no definite sequence; consequently, for all

practical purposes it is also acausal.

CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER V;
THE 'OTHER WORLDS' OF PHILOSOPHY

All the previously mentioned contemporary philosophers agree that epistemology suffers from a critical

need to 'bridge the gap between the notion of truth and

.

,
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the theory of meaning. A reluctant admission, however,
and of greater dimension, is the epistemic gap between
the physical and social sciences. The physical sciences,

through opposing 'fields' of quantum and relativity have
resolved their 'differences' and have continued to progress by accepting and combining their 'many worlds' into

physical epistemology -- and utilizing probable, pragmatic models for empirical adequacy.
However, philosophical epistemology still clings to
archaic 'either-or' linear conceptions -- in a Cartesian
sense. The contemporary philosophers mentioned are (as
a

usual) the 'annointed few' with the courage to think in

more than one dimension, and to agree that (finally)

philosophy should allie with the other disciplines for
a more 'empirically adequate' overview of truth/meaning.
Where our

'

avante-garde

(as demonstrated in this

'

philosophers fell short

thesis) is their lack of com-

plexity -- of not combining all major contemporary contributions into a workable overview -- like the physical
scientists have exemplified.
Hilary Putnam does make several contributions such
as his simple (but unworkable) 'correspondence theory;'
which states that 'snow is white' is true if and only if
snow is white is just a tautology. This tautology tells
us nothing about how 'snow is white' is used (in this
world) or understood, and nothing about its asser tability
etc. The formal logic of the concept is not all there is
to

the notion of truth,

that a correspondence account is

needed to understand how language works and how science
works
But like shown in the previous essays of the physical
and social sciences, there are 'other worlds of too

,
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complexed a nature, i£. nonlinear and acausal, to invalidate any simplistic correspondence.
Putnam practically lists most of the nonlinear
attributes necessary to match the advanced physical
sciences on an equal epistemology -- but then reverts to
an accustomed linear viewpoint. He describes the nonlinear
similarities between the brain and the computer, and admits
of an inner source

of prior probability by ver s tehn

but

then he later denies an inner world of consciousness.

Putnam's pluralism strongly admits of nonlinear complexities
with 'other worlds,' but refuses to coordinate them and
instead, he points to

linear,

'alternate epistemologies'

as a solution.

Bas C. Van Fraasen strongly includes the

'other

worlds' with their attributes, but presents its problems

within a linear, traditional epistemology. Fraasen submits
important epistemic advances, such as a cons true tive

empiricism to update scientific method, and an empirical
adequacy for pragmatic quantitative concepts.
Michael Dummett presents most of the attributes of
the various

'realisms' and admirably presents their pros

and cons. His most creative 'artistic showpiece' is his
article, "Can An Effect Precede Its Cause?" where Dummett

physics and astronomy) that
time is a fexible 'illusion' within relations -- but most
unfortunately, the 'critic' within him overtakes his
creative judgment and he regresses to where he started.

presents a valid case

(as in

Bruce Aune maintains the necessary creative impetus
toward a new epistemology. Through "Prichard's Theory
of Voluntary Activity," Aune maintains the viewpoint that

the mental process involves nonlinear complex events,
which places 'action' as a causa sui event.

.
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Along with Quine's 'Indeterminancy,' the learning
process is presented with a necessity for relating its
translations and references to other nonlinear events,
such as neural functioning and the 'other worlds' of
different individual viewpoints -- hinting at a similar

solution as Niels Bohr's 'complementarity.'
Hence, by combining the contributions of Fraasen,

Putnam, Dummett and Aune -- a credible new epistemology
can restore philosophy to its original "philsopher-

king" status -- over all the arts and sciences. An

'empirically adequate' epistemology by the probabilites
of pragmatic modals should be our first goal. Hopefully,
this thesis at least presents the urgency of disgarding

our Car tes ian- like linear thinking for a more unified

(though complexed) nonlinear overview.

RESOLUTION
def

the act of analyzing a complex

notion into simpler ones.
Now that sufficient epistemological problems have
been presented, a critical question arizes as to what
scientific method can we present for a consistent theory
of meaning?

strongly
Van Fraasen, Putnam, Dummett and Aune have
stated, if not implied, that some form of a unified,
nonlinear overview is needed -- as in the physical
epissciences. Then why not 'adapt' a similar physical
of truth
temology to bridge this 'gap' between the notion
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and the theory of meaning?

suggest a method similar to Niels Bohr's
'Complementarity' -- a resolution derived from contra
I

dictory or exclusive viewpoints.

Stephen Hawking had developed two very important and
apparently contradictory ways of looking at black holes/

white holes. In the 'world' of relativity or gravity
theory, matter expands;
in the Vorld' of quantum theory,

matter contracts. According to Hawking, "they were the same
thing,

in fact,

in different regimes."

His public state-

ment did not supply his 'resolution of complementarity'
as

to how they are "the same thing" -- but some epistemic

complementarity is evident, if not suggested -- by the
quotation: that both were needed to provide a comprehensive account.

.

,

"

CHAPTER

VI

INTRODUCING THE
'BOHREAN COMPLEMENT"
-- or Resolution Of Complementarity

In honor of Niels Bohr's Unitive Principle Of

Complementarity

I

would like to introduce the term,

"Bohrean Complement" -- to mean: "The Resolution of

Complementarity

.

This Bohrean Complement gives us the 'missing link'
for combining our Truth/Meaning Complexes into a non-

linear resolution.

However, there are two major difficulties:
but meanings are semantic
1. Truths are constants
variables i.e. they are nonlinear and changeable.
,

,

Any 'solution' or Bohrean Complement cannot be
thought of in the usual terminology of 'solution', i.e.
terms of overall 'conclusions' -- in a linear constant
2.

in

sense
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Then, what is a nonlinear resolution?
(which is a Bohrean Complement )

ANSWER: Changeable points of view.

Similar to Niels Bohr measuring electrons as particles o£ as waves, and Hawking measuring Black Holes from
a Quantum viewpoint or a Relativity viewpoint -- in both
cases we are dealing with changeable points of view of
complex entities -- that are not necessarily sequential!

Logicians can formulate abstract complementary relations between abs tract constants and abs trac t variables

within set theory or Quantum Logic -- which are derived
from a necessary sequential order or system. But, logic
has yet to confirm conclusions, not only from set abstract

constants

,

but from concrete complementary semantic

variables -- which have been (to date) too changeable to
convert to abstract instances for measurement.
The nearest that epistemology has

compensated for

any form of changeable, semantic variables, is with the

Bayesian schema: where

a

piece of new evidence confirms

hypothesis when the posterior probability of the
hypothesis is greater than its prior probability; that
a

is,

if

the conditiona l probability of the hypothesis on

the evidence is greater that the probability of the

hypothesis.
But the conditions (of the prior probabilities
mentioned) are sequential Semantic variables can be
.

(and usually are) derived from nonsequential complements,
i.e., derived from conscious 'constant variables' and

irrational 'changeable variables' -- usually in
opposition to each other.
Hence, how do you measure such nonsequential,

changeable variables that are not constant?
Changeable Bohrean Complements offer a potential
resolution but would require the unthinkable (?)
cooperation between epis temologists and logicians for
solution.

, ,
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